Using an estimated DSGE model that features monetary and …scal policy interactions and allows for equilibrium indeterminacy, we …nd that a passive monetary and passive …scal policy regime prevailed in the pre-Volcker period while an active monetary and passive …scal policy regime prevailed post-Volcker. Since both monetary and …scal policies were passive pre-Volcker, there was equilibrium indeterminacy that gave rise to self-ful…lling beliefs and resulted in substantially di¤erent transmission mechanisms of policy as compared to conventional models: unanticipated increases in interest rates increased in ‡ation and output while unanticipated increases in lump-sum taxes decreased in ‡ation and output. Unanticipated shifts in monetary and …scal policies however, played no substantial role in explaining the variation of in ‡ation and output at any horizon in either of the time periods. Pre-Volcker, in sharp contrast to post-Volcker, we …nd that a time-varying in ‡ation target does not explain low-frequency movements in in ‡ation.
Introduction
Macroeconomic models that are estimated and used for monetary policy analysis typically abstract from non-trivial monetary and …scal policy interactions. A theoretical literature starting with the work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) has however, long emphasized that monetary and …scal policies jointly determine equilibrium model dynamics. Moreover, the recent crisis which has brought to the fore issues of monetary and …scal policy interactions, due to unconventional monetary policy actions that can have signi…cant e¤ects on the government budget and great uncertainty about the future course of …scal policy, provides an additional impetus to model monetary and …scal policies jointly in macroeconomic models geared towards policy analysis.
Motivated by these considerations, we extend a standard DSGE model that features nominal and real rigidities to include an explicitly speci…ed description of …scal policy. Similar to the standard feedback rule for monetary policy that governs how nominal interest rates respond to in ‡ation and output, our model features a feedback rule for …scal policy that determines how taxes respond to debt, output, and government spending. 1 Moreover, the equilibrium of the economy in our model has to be consistent with the intertemporal government budget constraint.
In such a set-up, as shown by Leeper (1991) , Sims (1994) , and Woodford (1995) , the equilibrium model dynamics depend crucially on monetary and …scal policy stances, that is, the strength with which policies respond to the state of the economy. Equilibrium in our model is determinate under two cases: either when both the interest rate response to in ‡ation and the tax response to debt are strong (an active monetary and passive …scal policy regime) or when both the responses are weak (a passive monetary and active …scal policy regime). Indeterminacy of equilibrium arises when a weak interest rate response to in ‡ation is coupled with a strong response of taxes to debt (a passive monetary and passive …scal policy regime). 2 We use this model as a laboratory to answer four broad set of questions. First, what monetary and …scal policy regimes characterized post-War U.S. data? Second, what were the monetary and …scal policy transmission mechanisms over time? Third, which shocks were the primary sources of short and long-run variation in output, in ‡ation, and government debt? Fourth, what would have been the path of in ‡ation, especially with regards to the rise of in ‡ation in the 1970s; under a (counterfactual) monetary policy regime di¤erent from the estimated one?
We conduct our empirical analysis, following the literature, by splitting the data into two time-periods based on the timing of Paul Volcker's chairmanship at the Federal Reserve: a pre-Volcker period and a post-Volcker period. 3 Using likelihood based methods, we …t our model to data on nominal, real, and …scal variables. In particular, we use the likelihood based estimation method proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) that allows for indeterminacy in a DSGE model. 4 Allowing for the possibility of indeterminacy in an estimated DSGE model that features monetary and …scal policy interactions is a distinct contribution of our paper, and one that matters signi…cantly for our results. 5 Using a Bayesian model comparison exercise, we …rst assess the best-…tting policy regime in the two time-periods. With the posterior distribution of the parameters of the best-…tting model at hand, we then conduct several impulse response, variance decomposition, and counterfactual analyses.
Our main results are as follows. 6 First, using Bayesian model comparison we …nd that preVolcker, the best-…tting model is a passive monetary and passive …scal policy regime while post-Volcker, it is an active monetary and passive …scal policy regime. Thus, our results are consistent with those of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), who using univariate methods, provide evidence for a weak response of interest rates to expected in ‡ation in the pre-Volcker period. In a DSGE context, our results are also consistent with those in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . As we discuss below however, our results on the transmission mechanisms of monetary and …scal policies in the pre-Volcker period are in sharp contrast to the literature. Second, using impulse response analysis we show that the transmission mechanisms of monetary and …scal policies were substantially di¤erent in the two time periods. In particular, since both monetary and …scal policies were passive pre-Volcker, there was equilibrium indeterminacy that substantially altered the propagation mechanism of fundamental shocks in the economy due to self-ful…lling beliefs of the agents. For example, while pre-Volcker, an unanticipated increase in interest rates led to an increase in output and in ‡ation, post-Volcker, it led to a decline in output and in ‡ation. Moreover, while pre-Volcker, an unanticipated increase in the (lump-sum) tax revenues-to-output ratio led to a decline in output and in ‡ation, post-Volcker, it had no e¤ects on output or in ‡ation.
Pre-Volcker, the response of the economy to unanticipated policy shifts was thus similar to that predicted by the …scal theory of the price level (FTPL). 7 Under FTPL, an increase in interest payments due to a contractionary monetary policy increases spending by agents because of a positive wealth e¤ect. This then leads to an increase in in ‡ation and output. Moreover, shifts in …scal policy in ‡uence in ‡ation and output under FTPL due to wealth e¤ects. In contrast, post-Volcker, the response of the economy followed the predictions of standard models of price determination. Our …ndings in an estimated DSGE model that pre-Volcker, in ‡ation increased both on impact and afterwards following a monetary contraction and unanticipated movements in lump-sum taxes a¤ected both in ‡ation and output is new to the literature. For example, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), who only model monetary policy, …nd that in their indeterminate model in the pre-Volcker period, in ‡ation does not rise on impact following an interest rate increase. Our results are in fact quite close to those obtained from the identi…ed VAR literature. Since the work of Sims (1992) , it has been observed that in many VAR speci…cations, in ‡ation tends to increase on impact following a contractionary monetary policy shock. This has been dubbed the "price puzzle" in the literature since it goes against the predictions of the standard models of price determination. Hanson (2004) in a comprehensive study showed that this "price puzzle" seems to be a feature only of the pre-Volcker period and not for the entire post-War U.S. data. Our results are thus consistent with his …ndings and moreover, provide a model based interpretation. In addition, Sims (2011) provides some VAR based evidence on predictory power of …scal variables in explaining U.S. in ‡ation. We provide complementary evidence from our estimated model on this front, albeit only for the pre-Volcker period.
Third, using variance decomposition analysis we …nd that in both the time-periods and at both the short and long-run, unanticipated shifts in monetary and …scal policies play only a minor role in explaining the dynamics of in ‡ation and output. 8 For example, for in ‡ation, pre-Volcker, monetary and …scal policy shocks explain less than 10% of the variation at both horizons. Post-Volcker, both the shocks explain basically no variation at either horizons. For output growth, pre-Volcker, monetary policy shocks explain around 1:6% and …scal policy shocks explain around 6:0% of the variation in both the short and long-run. Post-Volcker, the monetary shock explains around 2:5% of the variation at both horizons while …scal policy shocks explain basically no variation in output growth. Our result that random variations in monetary policy do not explain much of the ‡uctua-tions in the data is consistent with the results in the identi…ed VAR literature, for example, 7 Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011) is a recent survey of the FTPL literature. In our model, FTPL is operative under a passive monetary and active …scal policy regime. We …nd that our estimated best-…tting model pre-Volcker, a passive monetary and passive …scal policy regime, mimics a passive monetary and active …scal policy regime in important dimensions, even though it is not technically one where the FTPL has to be operative for sure. 8 We focus on a 4 and 40 quarter horizon in our variance decomposition results. Sims and Zha (2006a) . That the same conclusion also holds for random variations in …scal policy, given by unanticipated movements in taxes, is completely new to the literature. While we …nd that random disturbances to policy do not matter, this does not imply at all that the systematic component to policy is also irrelevant. In fact, to the contrary, as we discuss below next, the propagation mechanisms of many shocks are substantially di¤erent in the two time-periods. This is exactly because the systematic responses of policy were dramatically di¤erent pre and post-Volcker, with di¤erent monetary and …scal policy regimes operative in the two time-periods. We also want to emphasize a similar point for indeterminacy. For the pre-Volcker period, sunspot shocks introduced due to indeterminacy play a minor role in explaining the dynamics of in ‡ation and output: they are irrelevant for in ‡ation dynamics and explain only around 11% of the variation at both horizons for output growth. While we thus …nd that sunspot shocks do not matter quantitatively, this does not necessarily imply that indeterminacy is not signi…cant for explaining macroeconomic dynamics in the pre-Volcker period. In fact, indeterminacy due to passive monetary and …scal policy leads to fundamentally di¤erent propagation mechanism of fundamental shocks, as agents'self-ful…lling beliefs play a key role in model dynamics.
Fourth, pre-Volcker, in sharp contrast to post-Volcker, we …nd that variations in the in‡ation target do not explain low-frequency movements in in ‡ation. In the recent DSGE literature, a consensus …nding has emerged that the long-run variation in in ‡ation is explained mostly by shocks to the in ‡ation target in the monetary reaction function. For example, Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) show that both pre-and post-Volcker, smoothed in ‡a-tion target shock tracks actual in ‡ation remarkably well. While we …nd a similar result in the post-Volcker period, our results are quite di¤erent in the pre-Volcker era: in ‡ation target shock explains virtually none of the long-run variation in in ‡ation. The major reason for this di¤erence is that we explicitly allow for the possibility of indeterminacy while estimating our model that features both monetary and …scal policies. When the operative regime is active monetary and passive …scal policy, as is the implicit assumption in Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) for both the time-periods, then changes in the in ‡ation target do explain in ‡a-tion in the long-run since monetary policy fully controls in ‡ation dynamics. Our best-…tting estimated model in the pre-Volcker features indeterminacy due to passive monetary policy, however. In this case, consider a decrease in the in ‡ation target. This, through the central bank reaction function, does tend to increase the interest rate. An increase in the interest rate in this model though, as we pointed out above, tends to increase in ‡ation. Thus, in ‡ation target movements do not track actual in ‡ation in the long-run.
Fifth, we …nd that the primary sources of short and long-run variation in in ‡ation, output, and government debt are di¤erent in the two time periods as the propagation mechanisms of various shocks varies because of changes in policy stances. As mentioned above, post-Volcker, low frequency movement in in ‡ation is explained by changes in the in ‡ation target. The high frequency movement is mostly explained by mark-up shocks, which is also a standard result in the literature. In the pre-Volcker period, in contrast, the role of mark-up shocks gets reduced in the short-run while that of technology and demand shocks increases. Moreover, demand and technology shocks also explain much of the variation in the long-run along with a nontrivial role for mark-up shocks. In particular, since monetary policy regime was passive in the pre-Volcker period, demand shocks that would typically be stabilized under active monetary policy end up in ‡uencing in ‡ation dynamics signi…cantly.
For output growth, in both periods, a combination of shocks explain variation at the two horizons, but the importance of a particular shock is quite di¤erent. For example, while preVolcker markup shocks are the most important source of variation in output growth (around 33%) at both horizons, post-Volcker, they account for no variation at either horizon. Thus, in the post-Volcker period, markup shocks, which lead to a trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilization under active monetary policy, a¤ected in ‡ation pre-dominantly without a¤ecting output. Government spending, technology, and demand shocks are important in both the time periods, although the role of demand shocks is much higher in the post-Volcker period.
For the crucial …scal variable, debt-to-output ratio, in both the time-periods, the shortrun variation is explained mostly by the transfer shock. In the long-run, a combination of shocks are important, but the relative contribution of these shocks across the two periods are again quite di¤erent. The policy regimes in place matter critically for the results as they lead to a di¤erent role for shocks in explaining in ‡ation movements. For example, demand, technology, and mark-up shocks are important drivers of long-run variation in debt-to-output in the pre-Volcker period while shocks to the in ‡ation target play a non-trivial role in the postVolcker period. This di¤erence arises because as mentioned above, these shocks are important drivers of long-run in ‡ation dynamics in the respective time periods, which plays a role in debt stabilization.
Our goal of addressing the sources of variation in macroeconomic variables at di¤erent horizons in a framework that allows for multiple shocks is similar to that of several VAR studies, such as Shapiro and Watson (1988) , and several DSGE-based studies, such as Smets and Wouters (2007) . One of our main contributions to this literature is to analyze these issues by …tting a DSGE model to data on both conventional variables such as output, in ‡ation, and interest rates as well as …scal variables such as taxes, spending, and debt.
Sixth, in a counterfactual exercise, we show that had the monetary policy regime of the post-Volcker era been in place pre-Volcker, in ‡ation volatility would have been signi…cantly lower: the predicted standard deviation of in ‡ation is 1:795% compared to the actual value of 2:722%. Moreover, the steep rise of in ‡ation in the 1970s would not have occurred. Therefore, a di¤erent systematic response of monetary policy to in ‡ation would have signi…cantly altered in ‡ation dynamics in the pre-Volcker period.
Model
Our model is based on the prototypical New Keynesian set-up in Woodford (2003) . While we consider a relatively small-scale model, we make certain extensions to the basic textbook set-up that are crucial for the issues that our paper intends to address.
We include external habit formation in consumption, partial dynamic indexation in price setting, and a time-varying in ‡ation target in the monetary policy rule, following the recent DSGE literature (Ireland (2007) , Cogley and Sbordone (2008) , Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010), and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)). We add these features because not only do they generate inertia and help capture low-frequency movements of the data, but also as emphasized by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , they help avoid biasing our conclusion towards indeterminacy since the model can generate fairly rich dynamics. Introducing timevarying in ‡ation target in our framework has an additional important bene…t as it allows us to disentangle better two competing hypotheses on the rise in in ‡ation in the pre-Volcker period: raised in ‡ation target (Sargent (1999) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010)) as opposed to changes in propagation mechanism of fundamental shocks or sunspot ‡uctuations due to indeterminacy (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) ).
We add to this set-up a complete description of …scal policy. The government in our model issues one-period nominal risk-less bonds and levies lump-sum taxes to …nance interest payments and exogenous streams of spending and lump-sum transfers. Similar to monetary policy, we posit an endogenous feedback rule for taxes.
Households
There is a continuum of households in the unit interval. Each household specializes in the supply of a particular type of labor. A household that supplies labor of type-j maximizes the utility function:
; where H j t denotes the hours of type-j labor services, C t is aggregate consumption, and C j t is consumption of household j. The parameters ; '; and are, respectively, the discount factor, the inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply, and the degree of external habit formation, while t represents an intertemporal preference shock that follows:
Household j's ‡ow budget constraint is:
where P t is the price level, B j t is the amount of one-period risk-less nominal government bond held by household j, R t is the interest rate on the bond, W t (j) is the competitive nominal wage rate for type-j labor, t denotes pro…ts of intermediate …rms, and (S t T t ) denotes government transfers net of taxes. 9 In addition to the government bond, households trade at time t one-period state-contingent nominal securities V j t+1 at price Q t;t+1 , and hence fully insure against idiosyncratic risk.
Firms
The …nal good Y t , which is consumed by the government and households, is produced by perfectly competitive …rms assembling intermediate goods, 
Monopolistically competitive …rms produce intermediate goods using the production function:
where H t (i) denotes the hours of type-i labor employed by …rm i and A t represents exogenous economy-wide technological progress. The gross growth rate of technology a t A t =A t 1 follows:
where a is the steady-state value of a t and " a;t i.i.d. N (0; 2 a ). 9 The budget constraint re ‡ects our assumptions that each household owns an equal share of all intermediate …rms and receives the same amount of net lump-sum transfers from the government. 10 is the steady-state value of t :
As in Calvo (1983), a …rm resets its price optimally with probability 1 every period. Firms that do not optimize adjust their price according to the simple partial dynamic indexation rule:
where measures the extent of indexation and is the steady-state value of the gross in ‡ation rate t P t =P t 1 . All optimizing …rms choose a common price P t to maximize the present discounted value of future pro…ts:
where
2.3 Government
Budget constraint
Each period, the government collects lump-sum tax revenues T t and issues one-period nominal bonds B t to …nance its consumption G t , lump-sum transfer payments S t , and interest payments. 11 Accordingly, the ‡ow budget constraint is given by:
which can be rewritten by expressing …scal variables as ratios to output:
Government spending and transfers follow exogenous processes given by:
where g and s are the steady-state values of g t and s t respectively, " g;t i.i.d. N 0; 2 g ; and 11 It might be worthwhile to relax the restriction of one-period governemnt bonds by allowing for long term debt as in Cochrane (2001) . This will reduce in ‡ation volatility under a passive monetary and active …scal policy regime.
Monetary policy
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule:
which features interest rate smoothing and systematic responses to deviation of output from its natural level Y t and deviation of in ‡ation from a time-varying target t . 12 R is the steady-state value of R t and the non-systematic monetary policy shock " R;t is assumed to
The in ‡ation target evolves exogenously as:
Fiscal policy
We assume a parsimonious …scal policy rule that somewhat resembles the interest rate rule (1). 13 The …scal authority sets the tax revenues-to-output ratio according to the …scal rule:
which features tax smoothing and systematic responses to deviation of lagged debt-to-output ratio from a time varying target b t 1 , deviation of output from its natural level, and deviation of government spending-to-output ratio from its steady state level. is the steady-state value of t and the non-systematic …scal policy shock" ;t is assumed to follow i.i.d.
Similarly to the in ‡ation target, the debt-to-output ratio target evolves exogenously as:
where b is the steady-state value of b t and
12 The natural level of output is the output that would prevail under ‡exible prices and in the absence of the shocks t : 13 The speci…cation is similar to that in Davig and Leeper (2011).
Equilibrium, policy regimes, and determinacy
Equilibrium is characterized by the prices and quantities that satisfy the households' and …rms' optimality conditions, the government budget constraint, monetary and …scal policy rules, and the clearing conditions for the product, labor, and asset markets:
Note that C j t = C t due to the complete market assumption. The details of the optimality conditions and the equilibrium are provided in the Appendix.
We use approximation methods to solve for equilibrium: we detrend variables on the balanced growth path by normalizing by A t and obtain a …rst-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state.
14 The linearized equations are standard and are provided in the Appendix. Here we describe the linearized policy rules and the government budget constraint to facilitate our discussion of determinacy and policy regimes:R
The equilibrium of the economy will be determinate either if monetary policy is active while …scal policy is passive (the AMPF regime) or if monetary policy is passive while …scal policy is active (the PMAF regime). Multiple equilibria exist if both monetary and …scal policies are passive (the PMPF regime). In our model, monetary policy is active if > 1
(1 + ') ; and …scal policy is active if b < 1 1: 15 14 We denote variable Xt At byX t . We de…ne the log deviation of a variable X t from its steady state X aŝ X t = ln X t ln X, except for the four …scal variables:
, andŝ t = s t s. 15 Note here that as shown in the Appendix, the relationships between the feedback parameters of the non-linear and linearized …scal policy rules are given by: b b~ b ; Y ~ Y , and g g~ g .
3 Empirical analysis
Method
The system of linearized equations is solved for its state space representation. The solution method for linear rational expectations models of Sims (2002) is applied under determinacy. Under indeterminacy, we employ a generalization of this method proposed in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) which expresses the solution of the model as:
where z t is a vector of model variables, " t is a vector of fundamental shocks, and t is a vector of sunspot shocks. The coe¢ cient matrices 1 ( ), 0;" ( ) ; and 0; ( ) are functions of the structural model parameters. 16 The matrix 0; ( ) = 0 under determinacy, but is not zero in general under indeterminacy. Thus indeterminacy introduces additional parameters, given by the matrix M in (2), and a sunspot shock. 17 With a distributional assumption on t (and " t ), one can construct the likelihood of the solution of the model using the Kalman …lter. We use conventional Bayesian methods widely used in the DSGE literature to …t the model to the data. Since it is di¢ cult to characterize analytically the posterior distribution of the structural parameters, we use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. We …rst …nd a mode of the posterior density numerically using csminwel by Christopher A. Sims. Then we use a random-walk Metropolis algorithm to draw a sample from the posterior distribution. The proposal density of the random-walk Metropolis algorithm is a Normal distribution whose mean is the previous successful draw and variance is the inverse of the negative Hessian at the posterior mode found before the simulation. The variance of the proposal density is scaled to achieve an acceptance rate of around 30%. For details of the random-walk Metropolis algorithm, see An and Schorfheide (2007) . For model comparison purposes, marginal likelihoods are estimated using the modi…ed harmonic mean estimator by Geweke (1999).
Data
We use six key quarterly U.S. data as observables: per-capita output growth, annualized in ‡a-tion, annualized federal funds rate, tax revenues-to-output ratio, market value of government debt-to-output ratio, and government spending-to-output ratio. A detailed description of the data is in the Appendix. To make our results comparable to those of Lubik and Schorfheide 16 is a vector of model parameters. 17 Appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the solution method. The corresponding measurement equations are given by:
Annualized interest rates (%) = 4R t + 4 (a + + ) Nominal tax revenue Nominal output (%) =^ t + 100
Nominal government debt Nominal output (%) =b t + 100 b
Nominal government purchases Nominal output (%) =ĝ t + 100 g where a 100( a 1), 100 ( 1); and 100( 1 1).
Prior distributions
We calibrate ' = 1 and = 8: 18 We also calibrate and b to 0:995 to restrict the role for time-varying policy targets to that of explaining low frequency behavior of the data only. For all the other parameters that we estimate, the priors we use are in Table 1 . For the mean value of observables and the technology growth rate, we use sample speci…c priors. We use the same priors across the two sample periods for all other parameters. Most of the priors that we use are standard in the literature. We discuss in detail two sets of priors that are unique to our analysis.
The …rst are those related to the policy rules. We impose each policy regime by reparameterizing two key policy parameters in the monetary and …scal rules:
and b . Denote the boundaries for active and passive policies by
1 respectively. Then let:
for the AMPF, PMAF, and PMPF regimes respectively. 18 and ' are not seperately identi…ed from :
The newly introduced parameters, and b , are assumed positive by specifying a gamma prior distribution with means 0:5 and 0:05 and standard deviations 0:2 and 0:04, respectively. This reparametarization thus ensures that we completely impose a particular policy regime during estimation. The implied 90% prior probability interval for is (1:189; 1:811) under AM and (0:185; 0:811) under PM while for b it is (0:003; 0:107) under PF and ( 0:102; 0:003) under AF (see Table 2 ). 19 The second are those related to the case of indeterminacy. As mentioned above, indeterminacy introduces additional parameters, given by the matrix M in (2). We try a few alternative speci…cations for the priors of those parameters. In the …rst speci…cation, we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and set the prior mean of the additional parameters in M so that the impact impulse responses of endogenous variables to fundamental shocks are as close as possible across the boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy region. Our DSGE model however, exhibits very di¤erent dynamics under determinacy and indeterminacy because of the monetary and …scal policy interactions. We thus do not …nd it very appealing to require that the DSGE model have similar dynamics across the determinacy and indeterminacy boundary. In the second speci…cation, we therefore set the prior mean of M to zero. Since 0;" ( ) and 0; ( ) in (2) are orthogonal, this speci…cation implies that the initial impact of fundamental shocks is orthogonal to that of sunspot shocks at the prior mean. In addition, we employ a quite di¤use prior for M to check the sensitivity of our results. In the remainder of this paper, we report the results based on the second speci…cation. Our results however, are completely robust across the di¤erent speci…cations.
Model comparison
We use marginal likelihoods across di¤erent policy regime speci…cations to compare model …t. As Table 3 shows, the data favors the PMPF regime pre-Volcker, which implies indeterminacy, and the AMPF regime post-Volcker. 20 In this regard, our …nding is in line with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . As we will show below however, the propagation mechanism under our PMPF regime is substantively di¤erent from that under indeterminacy in their paper. This underscores the importance of a complete speci…cation of monetary and …scal policies and the inclusion of …scal variables in model estimation.
Posterior estimates
In Table 4 we present the posterior estimates of the best …tting models for the two sample periods: PMPF for pre-Volcker and AMPF for post-Volcker. As to be expected, the estimates of some key policy parameters are di¤erent: the implied estimate of the posterior mean
In addition to the feedback parameters, we also …nd that the volatility of the two shocks in the monetary policy rule, " ;t and " R;t , changed signi…cantly across the sample periods. The standard deviation of the shock to the in ‡ation target dropped from 0:060 to 0:037 while the volatility of the monetary policy shock fell from 0:167 to 0:108. This …nding is in line with that of Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010), even though our policy regime in the pre-Volcker period is di¤erent from theirs and unlike them, we include …scal variables in our estimation. In contrast to shocks in the monetary policy reaction function, there was no substantial change in the volatility of the two shocks in the …scal policy rule, " b;t and " ;t , after the Volcker disin ‡ation.
With respect to the structural model parameters, we …nd that the degree of price stickiness increased in the post-Volcker period compared to the pre-Volcker period, while the degree of price indexation declined. These …ndings are consistent with results from a similar subsample estimation exercise in Smets and Wouters (2007) . We thus again show that these results of the literature are robust to the inclusion of a completely speci…ed …scal rule as well as …scal variables in model estimation. In addition, the degree of habit formation is lower pre-Volcker than post-Volcker, which again con…rms the …nding of previous studies such as Smets and Wouters (2007) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010). Our estimate in the pre-Volcker period, 0:217, however, is smaller than those obtained in the previous studies because under PMPF, the model can generate fairly persistent dynamics relative to under AMPF without requiring a high level of habit formation. 21 In terms of exogenous processes not related to the policy reaction functions, the standard deviation of most shocks decreased in the post-Volcker compared to the pre-Volcker period. For example, the standard deviation of the cost-push shockû t declined by a quantitatively important amount, which probably re ‡ects less signi…cant oil price shocks in the post-Volcker period. 22 The only exception to this is the demand shockd t which became more volatile in 21 When we imposed AMPF pre-Volcker, the esimate of is 0.750 and not signi…cantly di¤erent from the estimate in the post-Volcker period. 22 the post-Volcker period. In terms of the persistence parameter, while it decreased for most shocks, it increased quite a bit for the technology shockâ t and increased marginally for the government spending shockĝ t .
Propagation of shocks 3.6.1 Transmission mechanism of policy
In Figures 1 4 we present impulse responses to monetary and …scal policy shocks in the two sample periods. Our main …nding is that for the best …tting models, PMPF pre-Volcker and AMPF post-Volcker, the monetary and …scal policy transmission mechanisms are substantially di¤erent. In particular, we …nd that the monetary and …scal policy transmission mechanisms in our estimated PMPF model in the pre-Volcker era are similar to those that would prevail under PMAF in many important dimensions.
For the best …tting model pre-Volcker, as shown in Figure 1 ; a monetary contraction (i.e. an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate) leads to an increase, not a decrease, in output and in ‡ation. This result is in line with the prediction of the FTPL, which under determinacy would be operative under PMAF. FTPL predicts an increase in spending following an interest rate increase due to a positive wealth e¤ect, which then increases output and in ‡ation, as shown in Figure 1 . Thus our results provide a model based interpretation to the "price puzzle" of the identi…ed VAR literature: the tendency of in ‡ation to increase on impact following a contractionary monetary policy shock. Hanson (2004) in a comprehensive study showed that this "price puzzle" seems to be a feature only of the pre-Volcker period and not for the entire post-War U.S. data, which is consistent with our results.
In addition, pre-Volcker, the impulse responses to various …scal shocks resemble those predicted by the FTPL. For example, an exogenous increase in the lump-sum tax-to-output ratio produces a recession, decreasing output and in ‡ation as shown in Figure 3 , an event one would not observe under conventional AMPF. The interest rate decreases as well, only weakly responding to lower in ‡ation due to passive monetary policy. This is indeed the prediction of the FTPL: an increase in taxes leads to a negative wealth e¤ect, which decreases spending and thereby in ‡ation and output. This is shown clearly in Figure 3 : We thus …nd that our estimated best-…tting model pre-Volcker, a PMPF regime, mimics a PMAF regime in important dimensions, even though it is not technically one where the FTPL has to be operative for sure. 23 While the pre-Volcker U.S. economy was characterized by PMPF, it was under a AMPF regime post-Volcker. Accordingly, and unlike the pre-Volcker era, the impulse responses are in line with the predictions of standard monetary models: Figure 2 shows that an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a decrease, not an increase, in in ‡ation. In addition, as Figure 4 makes clear, exogenous adjustments in tax revenues do not a¤ect output, in ‡ation, and the interest rate, a conventional "Ricardian"equivalence result.
Moreover, Figures 2 and 4 show that post-Volcker, the PMPF model also produces quite similar dynamics to AMPF. For example, as shown in Figure 2 , the impulse responses to a monetary contraction are quite similar between the two regimes, although the error bands are much wider under PMPF. Similarly, Figure 4 illustrates that the two regimes have similar predictions also for the propagation of …scal shocks, since an unanticipated increase in taxto-output ratio has no meaningful impacts on output, in ‡ation and the interest rate while reducing debt-to-output ratio under both the regimes. While the dynamics are similar, since the PMPF regime involves many more estimated parameters, it is not favored over the AMPF regime in our Bayesian model comparison.
We emphasize that our results for the pre-Volcker period are thus data-driven, and not hard-wired into our model speci…cation and estimation. Depending on how agents form beliefs, as shown above, the model under PMPF can generate a wide range of dynamics, including those that resemble the outcomes under AMPF or PMAF or neither. By characterizing the full set of indeterminate beliefs with the additional parameters in M and the sunspot shocks, we construct the distribution of the agent's beliefs conditional on the data. In doing so, we …nd, for example, that the pre-Volcker data favors the agents'beliefs that in ‡ation would increase on impact (and afterwards) in response to monetary contractions. Under PMPF post-Volcker however, our estimates imply that the agents did not believe that in ‡ation would increase in response to interest rate increases. Similarly, the pre-Volcker data favors the agents'beliefs that in ‡ation would decrease on impact (and afterwards) in response to …scal contractions. Under PMPF post-Volcker however, our estimates imply that the agents believed that in ‡ation would increase in response to lump-sum tax increases on average. However, since the error band is quite wide and covers zero, the e¤ect is not signi…cant.
To make these mechanisms even more transparent, in Figure 5 ; we decompose the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks under PMPF in the two time periods into two components as given by (2): the part due to 0;" ( ) (the determined component) and that due to 0; ( ) M (the undetermined component that captures self-ful…lling beliefs): As is clear, while pre-Volcker, the self-ful…lling beliefs captured by the undetermined component imply an increase in in ‡ation following a monetary contraction, post-Volcker, they imply a decrease in in ‡ation. Similarly, in Figure 6 ; we decompose the impulse responses to …scal policy shocks under PMPF in the two time periods into the determined and undetermined components: As is clear, while pre-Volcker, the self-ful…lling beliefs captured by the undetermined component imply a decrease in in ‡ation following a …scal contraction, post-Volcker, they imply an increase in in ‡ation.
Variance decomposition
Role of random component of policy We showed above that transmission mechanisms of monetary and …scal policies are substantially di¤erent in the two time-periods. We next assess how important were the random components in policies in explaining variations in in ‡ation and output. Variance decomposition results, as given in Tables 5 and 6; show that in both the time-periods and at both the short and long-run, unanticipated shifts in monetary and …scal policies play only a minor role in explaining the dynamics of in ‡ation and output. 24 For example, for in ‡ation, pre-Volcker, monetary and …scal policy shocks explain less than 10% of the variation at both horizons. In particular, pre-Volcker, lump-sum tax shocks explain 3:1% of in ‡ation variation in the short-run and 1:3% in the long-run. These e¤ects, while smaller, are roughly the same order of magnitude as those of monetary policy shocks, which explain 8:1% of in ‡ation variation in the short-run and 4:6% in the long-run. Post-Volcker, while the …scal policy shock explains no variation at either horizon because the prevailing regime is AMPF, the monetary policy shock also is estimated to explain basically no variation at either horizon.
For output growth, pre-Volcker, monetary policy shocks explain around 1:6% while …scal policy shocks explain around 6:0% of the variation in both the short and long-run. PostVolcker, the monetary shock explains around 2:5% of the variation at both horizons while …scal policy shocks explain basically no variation in output growth. Our result that random variations in monetary policy do not explain much of the ‡uctuations in in ‡ation and output is consistent with the results in the identi…ed VAR literature, for example, Sims and Zha (2006a) . That the same conclusion also holds for random variations in …scal policy, given by unanticipated movements in taxes, is completely new to the literature.
Role of time-varying in ‡ation target
We next assess the role of time-varying in ‡ation target in explaining in ‡ation dynamics, in particular the rise in in ‡ation in the pre-Volcker period. In the recent DSGE literature, a consensus …nding has emerged that the long-run variation in in ‡ation is explained mostly by shocks to the in ‡ation target in the monetary reaction function. For example, Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) show that both preand post-Volcker, smoothed values of the in ‡ation target shock recovered from estimation track actual in ‡ation remarkably well. In contrast, we …nd that pre-Volcker, as opposed to post-Volcker, variations in the in ‡ation target do not explain low-frequency movements in in ‡ation. Table 5 clearly shows that while we …nd a similar result to Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) in the post-Volcker period, where the in ‡ation target shock accounts for 81:1% of the long-run variation in in ‡ation, our results are quite di¤erent in the pre-Volcker era, where the in ‡ation target shock explains only 5:5% of the long-run variation in in ‡ation. We make this result also clear in Fig. 7 ; which plots smoothed in ‡ation target shocks recovered from the estimation of the model in the two time-periods under various policy regime combinations. While in ‡ation target shock tracks in ‡ation well under an AMPF regime, this correspondence weakens substantially under either PMPF or PMAF.
The major reason for this di¤erence is that we explicitly allow for the possibility of indeterminacy while estimating our model that features both monetary and …scal policy. When the regime is active monetary and passive …scal policy, as is the implicit assumption in Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) for both the time-periods, then changes in in ‡ation target do explain in ‡ation in the long-run since monetary policy fully controls in ‡ation dynamics. Our best-…tting estimated model in the pre-Volcker features indeterminacy due to passive monetary policy, however. In this case, consider an increase in the in ‡ation target. This, through the central bank reaction function, does tend to decrease the interest rate. A decrease in interest rate in this model though, as we pointed out above, tends to decrease in ‡ation. Thus, in ‡ation target movements do not track actual in ‡ation in the long-run. Figure 7 thus makes clear how the role of time-varying in ‡ation target in tracking the low-frequency movement in in ‡ation depends crucially on the monetary and …scal policy regime in place.
In ‡ation, output, and debt dynamics We now address which shocks were major drivers of the dynamics of the three key variables in our model: in ‡ation, output, and debt-to-output ratio. Our main …nding is that the primary sources of short and long-run variations in in ‡ation, output, and debt are di¤erent in the two time periods as the propagation mechanism of shocks varies because of the change in monetary policy stances.
As mentioned above, and shown clearly in Table 5 ; post-Volcker, low frequency movement in in ‡ation is explained mostly by changes in the in ‡ation target. The high frequency movement is mostly explained by mark-up shocks, which is also a standard result in the literature. In the pre-Volcker period, in contrast, the role of mark-up shocks gets reduced in the short-run while that of technology and demand shocks increases. Moreover, demand and technology shocks also explain much of the variation in the long-run along with a non-trivial role for mark-up shocks. The important role of mark-up shocks at both horizons in the pre-Volcker period is not surprising given the oil price shocks of the 1970s: Moreover, in the pre-Volcker period, since the monetary policy regime was passive, demand shocks that would typically be stabilized under active monetary policy end up in ‡uencing in ‡ation dynamics signi…cantly.
To emphasize this role of demand shocks, in Figure 8 we report results on the implied counterfactual path of in ‡ation in the pre-Volcker period if we simulate our model using smoothed values of all other shocks except demand shocks. As is clear, the rise of in ‡ation in the 1970s is muted in that case.
For output growth, as shown in Table 6 ; in both periods, a combination of shocks explain variation at the two horizons, but the importance of a particular shock is quite di¤erent. For example, while pre-Volcker, markup shocks are the most important source of variation in output growth at both horizons (around 33%), post-Volcker, they account for no variation at either horizon. Thus, according to our estimates, in the post-Volcker period, markup shocks, which lead to a trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilization under active monetary policy, a¤ected in ‡ation pre-dominantly without a¤ecting output. Finally, government spending, technology, and demand shocks are important in both the time periods, although the role of demand shocks is much more substantial in the post-Volcker period. In fact, demand shocks explain over 50% of the variance in output growth at both horizons in this period.
It is also worth noting that for the pre-Volcker period, as Tables 5 6 make clear, sunspot shocks introduced due to indeterminacy play a minor role in explaining the dynamics of in ‡ation and output: they are irrelevant for in ‡ation dynamics and explain only around 11% of the variation at both horizons for output growth. Thus indeterminacy matters in our estimated model, not because of a non-trivial role for sunspot ‡uctuations, but mostly because self-ful…lling beliefs regarding fundamental shocks signi…cantly alter the propagation mechanisms in the model. Finally, to get insights into the determinants of short-and long-run dynamics of the crucial …scal variable, debt-to-output ratio, it is useful to consider the linearized government budget constraint which we reproduce below:
This equation makes clear that the dynamics of debt-to-outputb t are in ‡uenced by shocks that a¤ect either returnsR t 1 ^ t ; output growth b Y t b Y t 1 +â t ; or primary de…citĝ t ^ t +ŝ t : In both the time-periods, as Table 7 shows, the short-run variation is explained mostly by the exogenous transfer shock (60:8 and 73:6% respectively). Pre-Volcker, the remaining variation is explained by mark-up and technology shocks due to their e¤ects on in ‡ation, while postVolcker, it is explained by the …scal policy shock due to its e¤ect on tax revenues.
In the long-run, a combination of shocks are important, but the relative contribution of these shocks across the two eras are quite di¤erent. In both the periods, government spending shocks account for an important portion of the variation. Moreover, in the post-Volcker period, transfer and …scal policy shocks are also important drivers of long-run variation inb t : Finally, pre-Volcker, demand, mark-up, and technology shocks account for substantial variation in the long-run while post-Volcker, the in ‡ation target shock explains a non-trivial portion of the variation. These roles for the shocks arise because, as explained above, they are important drivers of long-run variation in in ‡ation in the respective time-periods.
Role of policy in the rise of in ‡ation
With the estimated structural model parameters at hand, we now conduct a counterfactual exercise. We assess the model implied path of in ‡ation, output, and debt-to-output ratio had the post-Volcker monetary policy regime been in place in the pre-Volcker period. In particular, with the estimated model parameters and smoothed shocks of the pre-Volcker period, we simulate our model by making two changes: shutting down the shocks^ t and " R;t while using the estimate of from the post-Volcker period. 25 First, we …nd that the model implied standard deviation of in ‡ation is 1:795%, which is substantially lower than the actual value of 2:722%. Moreover, Figure 9 ; where we plot the model implied path of in ‡ation together with actual in ‡ation, makes clear that under this monetary policy regime, the rise of in ‡ation in the 1970s would have been avoided. Thus, our counterfactual exercise suggests that a change in the systematic response of monetary policy would have mattered greatly for in ‡ation dynamics in the pre-Volcker era. Second, we …nd that while output growth would not have been quantitatively di¤erent, the debt-to-output ratio would have been higher in the 1970s. The higher debt-to-output ratio is a result of lower implied in ‡ation, which negates its role in debt stabilization. Figure 9 , where we plot the model implied path of output growth and debt-to-output ratio together with their actual paths, depicts these results clearly.
of policy to the state of the economy to be paramount in the propagation mechanism of both policy and non-policy shocks.
In future work, we plan to conduct several robustness exercises and also extend our methodology. Given Sims and Zha (2006b)'s …ndings using an identi…ed VAR that including a monetary aggregate in the monetary policy rule a¤ects inference regarding indeterminacy in the pre-Volcker period, we want to assess if this alteration to the monetary policy rule in ‡uences our model comparison results. Moreover, we plan to make our …scal policy speci…cation richer by allowing for countercyclical government spending, as emphasized recently by Cúrdia and Reis (2011).
More generally, it will be interesting to extend our methodology on two fronts. First, we can allow for time-varying volatility of shocks in our estimated DSGE model, along the lines of Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) . Second, extending our sub-sample analysis, we can estimate a DSGE model with recurring regime switching in both monetary and …scal policies, using the methodology provided in Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011). Tables   5 10 15 Note: The last column presents the 5th and 95th percentiles. The prior distribution of and b was obtained based on a simulation from the prior distribution of the structural parameters. Since the prior distribution of those parameters that determine the boundary condition of active and passive policy is identical pre-Volcker and post-Volcker, and b also have the same prior distribution across the subsamples. 
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Appendix
A System of equilibrium conditions
The technology process A t induces a common trend in output Y t , consumption C t ; real wagẽ
, government purchases G t , government debt B t =P t , tax revenues T t , and transfers S t . Since we solve the model through a local approximation of its dynamics around a steady state, we …rst detrend the variables as
Note that the …scal variables,
, and s t = S t =Y t are already stationary. We then rewrite the equilibrium conditions in terms of the detrended variables, compute the non-stochastic steady state, and then take a …rst-order approximation around the steady state. In the ensuing subsections, we present the equilibrium conditions in terms of the detrended variables and their …rst order approximations.
A.1 Equilibrium conditions in terms of detrended variables
Consumption Euler equation:
Labor supply:
Production function:Ỹ
Demand function:Ỹ
Firms'optimality condition:
Dixit-Stiglitz price aggregator:
Government budget constraint:
Monetary policy rule:
Fiscal policy rule:
Resource constraint:Ỹ t =C t + g tỸt :
A.2 First order approximation
We here present …rst-order approximation of the equations that are necessary to determine equilibrium dynamics of the observables.
Consumption Euler equation:
NK Phillips curve:
whereû t
(1 )(1 ) (1+' )(1+ ) 1 1^ t can be interpreted as cost-push shocks.
where b ; Y and g are respectively scaled counterparts of~ b ,~ Y and~ g :
and " ;t is given as:
" ;t " ;t i:i:d. N 0; 2 :
Government budget constraint: 
B Data description
We use the following de…nitions for our data variables: per capita output = (personal consumption of nondurable+personal consumption of services+government consumption) / civilian noninstitutional population; annualized in ‡ation = 400 log(GDP de ‡ator); annualized interest rates = the quarterly average of daily e¤ective federal funds rates; tax revenues = current tax receipts + contributions for government social insurance; government debt = market value of privately held gross federal debt; and government purchases = government consumption. Note that we use a single price level, GDP de ‡ator, for all the model variables (e.g. output, government debt, tax revenues, and government purchases).
The e¤ective federal funds rate and civilian noninstitutional population data were obtained from the FRED database of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The market value of privately held gross federal debt series was obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. All the other data were taken from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables.
C Solution method under indeterminacy
This section describes the solution method of a linear rational expectations (LRE) model under indeterminacy proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . Then we discuss an identi…cation problem in their method and how to address the problem. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) starts with the following canonical form of LRE models by Sims (2002) 0 z t = 1 z t 1 + " t + t ;
C.1 Sims (2002)
where z t is an n 1 vector of model variables, " t is an l 1 vector of fundamental shocks, and t is a k 1 vector of expectational errors, satisfyingE t t+1 = 0. We consider a case in which the exogenous fundamental shock process " t is serially uncorrelated. 26 Using the QZ (generalized Schur) decomposition, the coe¢ cient matrices 0 and 1 can be decomposed as QQ 0 = Q 0 Q = I and ZZ 0 = Z 0 Z = I. Let w t = Z 0 z t and multiply both sides of Equation (3) 26 A model with a serially correlated shock process can always be rewritten so that the model has a serially uncorrelated shock process by augmenting y t to include the original shock process. where t is a p 1 vector of sunspot shocks with E t t+1 = 0, A 1 is a k l matrix and A 2 is a k p matrix. Then A 1 and A 2 characterize the full set of solutions to the model (3). Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) show that the full set of solutions are given as
where M 1 is a (k r) l matrix and M 2 is a (k r) p matrix. When there exists a unique solution or r = k, V 2 = 0 and and the unique solution is not a¤ected by the sunspot shock t . When there exist multiple solutions or r < k, t a¤ects z t through their in ‡uence on t and also the impact of " t on t changes. The new parameters M 1 and M 2 are not determined by the structural parameters and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) propose to treat them as additional parameters. Since M 2 is not identi…ed in the model, only (k r) dimensions of the sunspot shocks matter. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) reparameterize t = M 2 t . Putting the solution of the expectational error t , (7), back to the model (3), a solution of the model can be written as z t = 1 z t 1 + 0;" + 0; M " t + 0; t :
C.3 Identi…cation problem
An identi…cation problem arises because V 2 , the left singular vectors of a SVD of Q 2 in (6), corresponds to zero singular values and thus is not identi…ed. Because of this problem, 0; in (8) is not well identi…ed. This appears to cause numerical instability in their solution method. For example, small changes in parameter values can easily lead to a large change in the likelihood of a LRE model under indeterminacy. Since in our model the degree of indeterminacy is at most one, 0; is simply a vector. We identify 0; by normalizing its …rst entry to its norm. With this normalization, posterior density maximization and simulation of our model is stable and works well. The normalization would a¤ect the posterior distribution of the entries of the matrix M in (8) . However, those parameters in M do not have behavioral interpretations. What matters is the additional channel for the propagation of the fundamental shocks, 0; M , whose posterior distribution is not a¤ected by the normalization if the prior distribution for the entries of M is ‡at. Although our baseline prior for the entries of M is not completely ‡at, it is very di¤use and the e¤ect of the normalization is not signi…cant. We tried di¤erent speci…cations for the prior distribution for the entries of M , including a uniform prior distribution over ( 5; 5) and our results were robust to these variations. The same argument applies to t .
